Trademarks: German Manufacturer’s Deliberate Infringement of Domestic Trademark Sufficient to Support Injunctive Relief, but Not Supportive of Award for Damages by Johnson, Kimley R
TRADEMARKS-GERMAN MANUFACTURER'S DELIBERATE INFRINGE-
MENT OF DOMESTIC TRADEMARK SUFFICIENT To SUPPORT INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF, BUT NOT SUPPORTIVE OF AWARD FOR DAMAGES.
After a long period of inactivity in the American market, plaintiff Ger-
man manufacturer' reentered the market, exporting pianos with trade-
marks identical to those of defendant domestic manufacturer who held
registered trademarks' under the Lanham Act. 3 After many years of con-
flict,' Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Grotrian) brought an action for declaratory judgment in re-
sponse to the opposition of Steinway & Sons (hereinafter referred to as
Steinway) to Grotrian's application for registration in the United States
Plaintiff was Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. [hereinafter referred to
as Grotrian]. Defendant was American manufacturer Steinway & Sons, [hereinafter referred
to as Steinway], a major domestic producer of pianos since 1850.
2 Steinway's trademarks included "Steinway & Sons," Trademark Registration No. 45,846
(Aug. 29, 1905): "Steinway," Trademark Registration No. 141,687 (April 26, 1921); and
"Steinway-The Instrument of the Immortals," Trademark Registration No. 285-732 (Aug.
4, 1931), 523 F.2d 1331, at 1335 n.5.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
The court found that the history of the relationship between the two parties was essential
to understanding the issues involved. In 1885 Heinrich E. Steinweg began the manufacture
of pianos in Germany. He emigrated to New York with three sons in 1850, changed his name
to Steinway and founded Steinway & Sons. His oldest son, C. F. Theodor Steinweg, remained
in Germany and began to make pianos under his own name. After selling his business to three
employees (Wilhelm Grotrian, Adolph Helfferich and H. G. W. Schulz), he moved to New
York in 1866 and joined Steinway & Sons as a partner.
The sale of the business included the right to use the name "C. F. Th. Steinweg Nachf."
for ten years. Later the name was changed to the present corporate name. Grotrian thereafter
registered "Grotrian-Steinweg" and "Steinweg" in Germany. The trademark "Steinweg" was
cancelled as a result of a suit by Steinway against Grotrian. In 1918 the Grotrian family
petitioned German officials to change its name to "Steinway, or at least Grotrian Steinweg,"
primarily to aid in the export of its product. This petition was granted to the extent of
changing the name to "Grotrian Steinweg."
Grotrian first exported pianos to the United States in 1925. It sold a total of 25 pianos until
Steinway learned of these sales in 1928 and protested, claiming tradename infringement. It
demanded discontinuance of the use of the name, but Grotrian, undaunted, increased its
shipments to 47 in 1929. Thereafter an official of Steinway went to Germany for a personal
confrontation and a settlement was reached, symbolized by the smoking of a cigar (the "peace
cigar settlement"). Between 1932 and 1952 no pianos were exported to the United States.
Grotrian reentered the American market in 1952 on a mail order basis. It then exported a
total of 458 pianos for the next twenty years and distributed them through small dealers,
supplying the dealers with their own promotional materials. Steinway learned of these sales
as early as 1957 but did nothing until 1967. In January of that year, Grotrian entered into a
distributing agreement with the Wurlitzer Company for sale and distribution for five years.
After issuing a press release Wurlitzer was threatened with legal action by Steinway to
prevent the sale of these pianos in the United States. Wurlitzer subsequently cancelled the
distribution contract.
No legal action was taken by either party until the instant action was begun on July 29,
1969.
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of the trademark "Grotrian-Steinweg". Steinway filed a counterclaim
under the Federal Trademark Act (hereinafter referred to as the Lanham
Act6) and at common law for trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion.' The district court granted an injunction to Steinway after concluding
that Grotrian had infringed its trademarks in violation of § 32(1) of the
Lanham Act" and allowed recovery of damages for infringement and profits
made by Grotrian along with the costs of the action under § 35.9 It further
denied all relief sought by Grotrian and dismissed its complaint.'" Held,
affirmed in part, modified in part. While the district court's finding of
conscious and intentional infringement was not clearly erroneous, the fail-
ure of Steinway to act for ten years after Grotrian's sales began again was
an abandonment of any claim for monetary relief despite Grotrian's delib-
erate infringement. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
Although the use of marks on goods can be traced back four thousand
years, the present judicial conception of the function of a trademark has
its source in usage as a mark of origin in merchant's guilds in the Middle
Ages." Common law developments and prior statutory attempts were codi-
fied in the Lanham Act in 1946, primarily to strengthen the protection of
these intangible property rights. Most writers have traditionally viewed
trademarks as having a dual function: (1) identification of the source of
origin of a particular product and the protection of the manufacturer's
investment in it and (2) protection of the public from deceit. 2
' On Sept. 11, 1967, Grotrian filed an application, Serial No. 280,051 in the Patent Office,
seeking registration of its trademark "Grotrian-Steinweg" and design. After publication for
operation, Steinway filed a Notice of Opposition on March 19, 1969. 523 F.2d at 1335 n.3.
15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1970).
In addition to a declaratory judgment that its trademark did not infringe Steinway's
mark, Grotrian sought to enjoin Steinway's threats of interference with its use of its trade-
mark and from filing suit anywhere in the world to challenge Grotrian. It also sought $93,000
damages for tortious interference with its contractual relationship with Wurlitzer, plus attor-
neys' fees.
Steinway sought an injunction of Grotrian's use of the word "Steinweg" and an accounting
of all profits received as a result of Grotrian's activities. It also sought compensatory and
punitive damages for injuries, plus attorneys' fees. Grotrian's reply pleaded the defenses of
laches and unclean hands. 523 F.2d at 1335.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 1117.
"' 365 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS, 20-
21 (1925). For the common law definition of trademarks, see 3 REST. TORTS § 715 (1938). This
definition is substantially the same under the Lanham Act.
11 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The Congressional purpose behind the 1946
enactment was succinctly stated:
To protect trademarks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster
fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of repu-
tation and goodwill by preventing their diversion from those who have created them
to those who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed.
Id. at 1275.
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Trademark infringement, as a species of the broader tort spectrum of
unfair competition, is an area of the law peculiarly dependent on the fact
situation presented in each case."3 Most major actions are based on § 32(1)
of the Lanham Act which prevents the "use in commerce (of] any reprod-
uction . . . of a registered mark in connection with the sale . . . of any
goods or services . . . with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
. . . mistake, or to deceive."' 4 Section 35 provides substantial recovery for
those who can establish a violation of § 32: "[t]he plaintiff shall be enti-
tled . . , subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action." 5
The decisive issue in a determination of infringement is a judicial find-
ing of likelihood of confusion" in the minds of the purchasing public. 7
Fraudulent intent, even though not a necessity for proof of infringement
of a registered mark," is an important element in determining likelihood
of confusion. 9 Originally, this-confusion which the Lanham Act attempted
to prevent was primarily that of purchasers as to source of origin. The 1962
amendment broadened the scope of protection to include other types of
confusion or deception.2 Even when the two marks could be distinguished
11 The necessity of the case-by-case approach was aptly stated by Judge Sneed in HMH
Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1974):
Trademark infringement is a peculiarly complex area of the law. Its hallmarks
are doctrinal confusion, conflicting results, and judicial prolixity. The source of this
difficulty is that each case involves an effort to achieve three distinct objectives
which, to a degree, are in conflict. These are: (1) to protect consumers from being
misled as to ... enterprises, from which the goods or services emanate ... ; (2)
to prevent an impairment of the value of the enterprise which owns the trademark;
and (3) to achieve these ends in a manner consistent with the objectives of free
competition.
Id. at 716.
14 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) (1970). This section provides for civil liability without the necess-
ity of proving intent to deceive. Id. § 1114(1).
, Id. § 1117.
" Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 461 (1st Cir. 1962).
, The factors to determine likelihood of confusion used by the district court included the
strength of the Steinway marks; the purpose of adoption by the alleged infringer; the degree
of similarity between the two; the degree of similarity of the products; the competitive
proximity of the products; and actual confusion and degree of care likely to be exercised by
purchasers. 365 F. Supp. at 712. See also 3 REST. TORTS § 729 (1938); B&L Associates v. H.
Daroff & Sons, Inc., 421 F.2d 352, 354 (2d Cir. 1970); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408
F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969). Here, Grotrian did not contest the legal standard use by the trial
court; rather, it challenged the finding of likelihood of confusion. 523 F.2d at 1336.
" 2 S. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 23.31 (1973).
Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U.S. 179 (1916).
Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Senate report states that these changes were made for clarification and coordination, and
to include "potential as well as actual purchasers." S. Rep. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
2847 (1962).
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by a detailed comparison, the "general overall impression" of the trade-
mark is the test to be applied."
Turning to the instant case, the appellate court extensively reviewed the
findings of the district court." The court examined the evidence of
Grotrian's deliberate intent to infringe, as the plaintiff urged that Stein-
way was collaterally estopped from attacking a factual determination of
bad faith litigated in the German Supreme Court in 1926. The court re-
fused to reach this issue on appeal, deciding in the alternative that a
finding of malice was amply supported by the evidence of Grotrian's ac-
tions since 1926.23 The translation of the surname into English resulted in
virtually identical sounds.2' Blatant reproduction of Steinway's slogan was
also found in other advertising brochures published by Grotrian. 5
The court then turned to the factors of the similarity of the marks, actual
confusion, and the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
Although a visual distinction was possible (the typefaces were different
" Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Cheesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 762 (2d Cir. 1960).
21 Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules, the standard of review is the "clearly erroneous"
standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 28 U.S.C. However, the alleged infringer's intent is usually
an issue to be determined by the trial court. Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506,
509 (2d Cir. 1969). Since the evidence here was a comparison of advertising copy and the
marks themselves, the appellate court is in as good a position to make the determination as
the trial court. See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1974). For other
cases holding the same, see Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d
1097, 1100 (2d Cir. 1969); J. R. Wood & Sons, Inc. v. Reese Jewelry Corp., 278 F.2d 157, 158
(2d Cir. 1960). Miles Shoes v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952); Determina-
tion of actual confusion is reserved for the district court as the trier of fact. Blue Bell, Inc. v.
Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., supra, 497 F.2d at 435.
2 523 F.2d at 1337. Grotrian urged that the district court had rewritten the firm's history
and, as the court stated, "seems especially piqued that the court inferred bad faith from the
family's name change." Id. In offering the decisions of the German court, the plaintiff was
attempting to prove the lack of bad faith as previously determined in a judicial proceeding.
The admissibility of these decisions was challenged under Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(a), but the
district court refused to rule on their admissibility, holding that they were irrelevant on the
ground that decisions of foreign courts on the respective trademark rights of the parties have
no application to litigation in an American court concerning trademark rights. 365 F. Supp.
at 719. The appellate court refused to reach the "tempting" issues of Rule 44(a) and collateral
estoppel from the German decisions. 523 F.2d at 1337.
11 This resulting identity was exploited by the plaintiff's instructions to its dealers in its
advertising materials, which gave instructions as to the phonetic pronunciation to English-
speaking readers. 523 F.2d at 1338.
The plaintiff's assertion of lack of knowledge of the registration (not the existence) of
the slogan was insufficient to justify its copying. Neither was it a common term entitled to
"fair use" by all. Section 33(b)(4) establishes the "fair use" defense, constituting use other
than as a trademark of the "party's individual name in his own business .. " 15 U.S.C. §
1115(b)(4). This is a statutory statement of a common law defense and can only succeed when
the term is used in a manner other than as a trademark. Venetianaire Corp. of America v.
A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970). See also 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAw
OF UNFAIR CoMPErmON AND TRADEMARKS § 85.1(b) (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALL-
MANN]; Kiki Undies Corp. v. Alexander's Department Stores, 390 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1968).
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and the surname was hyphenated), the conclusion that auditory confusion
was inevitable indicated a substantial similarity of marks. 6 The fact that
the parties were in direct competition for a limited class of customer was
undisputed. Since the Steinway name was one of such distinction in the
United States, association of the two in the domestic market was inevita-
ble. Several instances of actual dealer confusion were cited, and two sur-
veys commissioned by Steinway were admitted that demonstrated actual
confusion.2 When considering the degree of care likely to be exercised by
the class of purchasers, the court refused to hold that "actual or potential
confusion at the time of purchase necessarily must be demonstrated to
establish trademark infringement under the circumstances of this case.""
Despite the care exercised by potential purchasers, the court held that
Grotrian intentionally infringed Steinway's trademarks and had engaged
in unfair competition. 9
The relief granted below was modified to vacate the award of damages
and profits on the basis of Steinway's failure to take action in the ten years
following its first notification of Grotrian's reentry into the American mar-
ket. The court agreed that there had been no prejudice to Grotrian because
of the delay, thereby disallowing the defense of laches.35 However, since the
z1 The court began its examination of the similarity of sound by stating that
"[t]rademarks, like small children, are not only seen but heard." 523 F.2d at 1340. Similarity
of sound is another factor to be weighed in determining likelihood of confusion. LaTouraine
Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 771
(1946); David Sherman Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1965).
11 523 F.2d at 1340. The admission of the surveys was challenged by Grotrian on appeal.
Substantial authority supported the admission of such surveys and the court held that there
was no error in admitting such evidence but rather considered the weight to be given to the
surveys. On the question of admissibility of surveys in proof of confusion, see generally,
President and Trustees of Colby College v. Colby College-New Hampshire, 508 F.2d 804, 809
(1st Cir. 1975); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir.
1973).
" 523 F.2d at 1342 (emphasis by court). The district court had held that the sophistication
or discrimination of the limited class of customer was insufficient to eliminate the likelihood
of confusion. 365 F. Supp. at 717. The appellate court rejected Grotrian's contention that the
nature and cost of the product had received insufficient consideration. The harm to Steinway
was that consumers were likely to associate the two names and the likelihood that Grotrian
would attract customers based on Steinway's past reputation. HMH Publishing Co. v. Brin-
cat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969,
973 (2d Cir. 1948), overruled in part on other grounds, Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit
Products Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965) (on question of availability of accounting).
" The unfair competition claim was governed by the same considerations as the infringe-
ment claim. For the same reasons that the court held that Grotrian's actions constituted
infringement, the court upheld the district court finding of unfair competition. 523 F.2d at
1342 n.21.
3 523 F.2d at 1343. The court felt that there was no abuse of discretion by the lower court
in view of Grotrian's deliberate attempt to trade on Steinway's reputation. Id. at 1344. See
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 397 (2d Cir. 1965);
My-T Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1934); Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,
26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
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award of damages in infringement cases is expressly subject to principles
of equity,3' the court held that Steinway had abandoned its claim for
monetary relief.2 Injunctive relief against future infringement is not neces-
sarily accompanied by a monetary award for past damages suffered. 31
In overall results, the court was correct in its assessment of the infringe-
ment and unfair competition suffered by the defendant. The factor that
appeared most significant in the weighing of the peculiar facts involved
was the deliberate nature of the plaintiffs infringement. Even this inten-
tional conduct will, however, remain subject to principles of equity in each
case where justice requires consideration of delays occasioned by either
party.
As a sidelight to the actual decision, it is interesting to watch the court
follow the lead of other cases in this area, avoiding questions of conflicts
of laws principles andthe application of foreign judgments. 4 While the
rights and liabilities of United States citizens who compete with foreign
nationals in their home countries are governed by foreign law, the existence
of multilateral conventions on the subject rarely enters into actual litiga-
tion.15 The existing multilateral treaty on trademark protection and unfair
competition, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, 8 has as its basic principle the use of the domestic law of each member
state. 7 A minimum standard of unlawful competition has been set in arti-
cle 10,3 but the implementation of this guaranteed minimum is left to each
"' Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Veb Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d
686, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1970). Section 35 gives the district court the "broadest kind of discretion
in tailoring the plaintiff's recovery ... ." Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products
Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1965).
1, 523 F.2d at 1344. This was done notwithstanding the deliberate infringement. See Hano-
ver Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419 (1916).
11 Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir.
1965). An accounting of profits is proper if it can be inferred that there is a relationship
between these profits and the injury suffered, as an indirect measurement of the injury. Id.
This can be allowed in cases other than where the parties are in direct competition. Id. at
395.
1 See note 23 supra. Most American cases involving questions of unfair competition in
connection with other countries have ignored questions of conflicts principles. Vanity Fair
Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 n.7 (2d Cir. 1956).
' The international convention (to which the United States is a party) provides protection
to United States trademarks only to the extent that the foreign law involved recognizes this
as a treaty obligation creating private rights. See Convention Revising the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, art. 2, done July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
mId.
', Wengler, Laws Concerning Unfair Competition and the Conflict of Laws, 4 AM. J. COMp.
L. 167, 171 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Wengler].
Paris Convention, supra note 35. This article states:
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries
effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commer-
cial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
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signatory. In addition, no international oversight is provided. This basis
in national law creates practical difficulties in extraterritorial enforcement
of one's domestic law, as well as necessitating invocation of principles of
international comity" in cases where relief is sought for actions taken
outside the territorial limits. The Convention merely assures that foreign
nationals will be given the same treatment in each member state as that
country makes available to its own citizens, and creates no private rights
under United States law for acts of unfair competition occurring in foreign
countries.'0 Section 44 of the Lanham Act, as an attempt to implement this
Convention, provides certain benefits to signatories under the federal regis-
tration system." Legal rights are further complicated due to the distinct
groups of member countries who have either ratified or failed to ratify the
subsequent revisions of the Convention.4 1
Conflicts principles and questions of the applicability of foreign judg-
ments could present additional problems in this area. This court refused
to rule on these questions, finding alternative grounds for disposition of the
case. 3 In the absence of a controlling international obligation, other policy
issues assume decisive importance and decisions reached will reflect na-
tional self-interest" rather than being based entirely on the merits of the
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with
the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a com-
petitor;
2. false allegations of the course of trade which are of such a nature as to
discredit the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities of
a competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to
mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics,
the suitability for their purpose or the quantity, of the goods.
Id. art. 10.
11 Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956).
4 Id. at 640. The Paris Convention itself is not directly applicable in the instant case, as
this involved trademark rights within the United States subsequent to Grotrian's application
to register its trademark. 523 F.2d at 1334-35. The Paris Convention does not insulate foreign
nationals from liability for trademark infringement committed in the United States. 4
CALLMANN, supra note 25, § 99.2 (Supp. 1975).
" Lanham Act § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1970). But see Frayne, History and Analysis of TRT,
63 TRADEMAuK REP. 422, 440 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Frayne].
42 4 CALLMANN, supra note 25, § 99.1. On June 12, 1973, the United States signed the new
Trademark Registration Treaty which is of yet unratified by the Senate. This treaty is still
not a true international registration of trademarks. Essentially it remains a filing treaty. Once
the filing has occurred, national law again regulates the rights of the trademark holders.
Frayne, supra note 41, at 430. For an exposition of the principal provisions of this treaty,
see id. at 431-34.
,3 See note 23 supra.
4 Note, Toward a Substantive Private International Law of Trademarks: The Lessons of
the Carl Zeiss Litigation, 82 YALE L. J. 1072, 1081 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note]. To raise
conflicts questions, the case must necessarily involve a conflict with a foreign legal system.
Such is not the case here.
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case. Even though there is substantial agreement among all legal systems
on the general principles of unfair competition,"5 uniform international law
would eliminate conflicts among legal systems." At present, the lack of
consensus47 on the applicability of foreign judgments encourages domestic
courts to avoid resolution of conflicts issues and to base decisions on alter-
native grounds. Definitive resolution on the international level would be a
better solution, taking such questions out of the hands of domestic courts.
The ultimate purpose of the system of trademark rights is to protect the
consuming public. All nations share this interest," which should facilitate
international cooperation.
If current growth of international commerce continues as expected, con-
flicts between nations in the interest of protection of domestic markets will
substantially increase. It is hoped that satisfactory resolution of these con-
flicting demands will be forthcoming, as the problems of international
trade are of vital concern to the international economy: "World trade is
pre-eminently a matter of international concern; the inexorable corollary
is that traders must comply with and contribute to the realization of inter-
national standards. The enormous power of global corporations is of great
political consequence and must be subjected to commensurate supervision
and direction."48  The Second Circuit correctly decided the issues of do-
mestic trademark infringement before it. In particular, its denial of dam-
ages recognizes the overriding principles of equity in fashioning appropri-
ate relief. However, the avoidance of the "tempting" issues of foreign liti-
gation reemphasizes the need for effective international agreement. It re-
mains to be seen if a truly effective international obligation governing the
respective rights of trademark owners in foreign countries, whether by
treaty commitment or uniform national laws, can be developed in the field
of trademark rights and unfair competition.
Kimley R. Johnson
Rappeport, Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition in International Conflict of Laws: An
Analysis of the Choice of Law Problem, 20 U. Prr. L. REV. 1, 15 (1958-59).
" Wengler, supra note 37, at 169-70. The issue of collateral estoppel from foreign judgments
was also avoided by this court. For a discussion of these questions, see Smit, International
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44, 69-74
(1962).
"T It is unclear exactly what American practice is regarding issues of fact preclusion in
foreign litigation. See Lewis, Mutuality in Conflict-Flexibility and Full Faith and Credit,
23 DRAKE L. REV. 365 (1974) for a discussion of the various practices in the United States.
" Note, supra note 44, at 1090. For a discussion of the current attempt at an international
registration system and its advantages and disadvantages for the United States, see 63
TRADEMARK REP., an entire issue devoted to the Trademark Registration Treaty.
11 Reisman, Polaroid Power: Taxing Business for Human Rights, 4 FOREIGN POLICY 101, 109
(1971).
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